THE EUROPEAN CRISIS OF THE 1590s

Essays in Comparative History

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5 *Civil War and Natural Disaster in Northern France*

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While famine, plague, and periods of acute economic distress were recurrent phenomena in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France, the last decades of the sixteenth century witnessed so closely spaced and devastating a series of catastrophes throughout the northern half of the kingdom as to mark these years off as ones of truly exceptional hardship. The backdrop was one of political conflict and disintegration. France's apparently interminable civil wars moved in a crescendo from 1585 onwards, as the emergence of the Protestant Henry of Navarre as heir apparent to the throne led to the revival of the militant Catholic League and renewed fighting against the Huguenots. In May 1588, the *ligueurs* of Paris rose up and drove Henry III from the capital. Seven months later, the assassination of the duke and cardinal of Guise at Blois prompted much of the rest of France to follow in revolt. The country soon plunged into the longest, bitterest, and most geographically all-encompassing conflict of the wars of Religion, a conflict which lasted until 1594 in most parts of the country but was not everywhere extinguished until 1598. These years stand out as particularly terrible ones in northern France, since, unlike the Midi, the region had been only lightly touched or even bypassed altogether by campaigning prior to 1588, while now it became the centre of the conflict. But the wars of the League were just part of a larger cycle of calamities here that also included catastrophic harvest failures over much of the region in 1586–7 and 1594–7 and serious outbreaks of plague between 1580 and 1586 and again between 1596 and 1598. Marauding bands of wolves were even terrifying the inhabitants of several areas by the middle 1590s. All four outriders of the apocalypse were at large.

That this series of closely spaced shocks had exceptionally serious consequences for northern France's economy and demography is clear from all the available evidence. Strong regional contrasts had marked northern France's economic history over the decades prior to the 1580s, with some areas enjoying a continuation of the demographic and commercial expansion of the earlier sixteenth century, others suffering from the fighting in the 1560s but then recovering markedly in the 1570s and early 1580s, and still others enduring a steady dose of hardship and decline, not



Figure 5.1 *Mortality.*



Figure 5.2 *Grain prices.*

always caused simply by the political events of the earlier Wars of Religion.[1] From the 1580s on, the evidence points unambiguously in a single direction. The only two sets of mortality figures available reveal sharp peaks in the 1580s and 1590s (see Figure 5.1), Price curves attain their highest levels of the entire period 1500–1625 at this time (see Figure 5.2). Sharp valleys appear in all detailed curves of industrial and agricultural



Figure 5.3 *Tithe yields.*



Figure 5.4 *Cloth production.*

production (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4). Those historians who have written about this period employ tragic superlatives to describe these last decades of the century. 'Les années terribles' is Jean Jacquart's label for the period 1589–94.[2] Henri Drouot concludes: 'La verité . . . est que la Bourgogne, depuis le haut moyen âge, n'a jamais autant souffert qu'a la fin du XVIe siècle.'[3]

While agreeing that these were years of exceptional suffering, recent scholars have at the same time differed somewhat over the precise nature and causes of the hardships. Some, like Jacquart, present the 'crisis' essentially as a consequence of the civil wars. Others, like Pierre Goubert and Alain Croix, have called attention to the role of disease and famines unrelated to the political upheavals, thereby suggesting, if only by implication, that France's crisis might also be linked to larger meteorological and epidemiological problems affecting all of Europe's Atlantic seaboard.[4] Some of the difference in emphasis here stems from the different phenomena examined. Those writing about the period's demography are particularly prone to stress non-war-related factors, since indeed the periods of peak mortality did not always coincide with the years of civil war. Conversely, those historians who have explored the volume of trade or the evolution of rural society tend to emphasise the impact of the fighting, since it disrupted the normal circuits of production and exchange more thoroughly and enduringly than did simple plagues or famines, even when

it did not kill as many people outright. But the different emphases also reflect the sort of regional variation evident in Figure 5.1, the graph of mortality in two localities for which we have detailed information on this topic, Rouen and the region around Nantes. Serious and recurrent plagues made the early 1580s, years of peace, the period of highest mortality in the consistently crisis-prone Pays Nantais. In Rouen, on the other hand, where just two periods of high mortality stand out, 1586–7 and 1592–3, the second, greater crisis was the direct outcome of civil war, specifically of the siege of the city in 1591–2.[5] It is certain that the northern French 'crisis of the 1590s' (actually of the 1580s and 1590s) shared characteristics with the situation in neighbouring countries and yet was exceptionally severe because of France's particular political problems, but only a detailed narrative of these years can lay bare the precise way in which war, plague, and famine fit together to compose this crisis and the significant variations in its character and chronology from region to region.

I

In an account of France's recent 'maulx' written some time after 1595, Jacques Carorguy, a scribe of Bar-sur-Seine, began his litany of woe with the year 1582. His reason for choosing this year as his starting point was rather idiosyncratic; it was, he recorded, the year in which Pope Gregory XIII eliminated ten days from the year, a 'nouveaulté . . . estrange et d'ung synistre presage'.[6] But Carorguy was not the only chronicler to date France's troubles back to the early 1580s, and with good reason. The plague, which had been largely absent from France since the mid-1560s (see Figure 5.5), returned to many areas with a vengeance from 1580 to 1586, affecting localities scattered throughout northern France.[7] The example of the Pays Nantais shows just how severe this plague was in those areas most seriously touched. Not only did burials attain easily their highest levels of the entire troubled period from 1575 to 1600; the decline in the number of births registered in the years 1580–4 was also the sharpest of any five-year period between 1550 and 1600.[8] As was typical with plagues in this era, however, the incidence of the disease was very uneven. Many localities were spared entirely, and others, such as Rouen, were only lightly touched. Plague was reported in Normandy's capital in 1580 and 1581, but no significant increase is visible in the number of burials.[9]

On the heels of the plague came the terrible *crise de subsistences* of 1586–7 which affected so much of north-western Europe. From Lorraine and the Lyonnais to Normandy, the harvest was poor in 1585 and worse the next year. 'No one could remember a comparable *disette de vivres* since time immemorial', wrote Carorguy.[10] A mark of the severity of the crisis was



Figure 5.5 *Number of localities touched by plague, by year.*
Source: J.-N. Biraben, *Les Hommes et la Peste en France* . . . (Paris, 1975), Vol. 1, p. 120.

the virtual war waged by municipal authorities throughout northern France and beyond to obtain a sufficient supply of grain for their towns. Rouen's authorities commissioned substantial purchases from the Baltic, only to see several shiploads of grain confiscated and sold in Southampton, where they had been taken by privateers.[11] Faced by rioting in the markets, the mayor and *échevins* of Abbeville similarly stopped a convoy of Danzig rye purchased by Amiens's town council, commandeered half of the stock, and subsequently refused to recompense Amiens even in the face of royal orders to do so.[12] This sort of emergency procurement of grain, and the creation of *ateliers de charité* in many cities, could mitigate the effects of the famine only very imperfectly. Although 14,000 people were receiving relief in Rouen at the worst of the crisis, the ravages of disease among the malnourished population still sent mortality rates soaring. 'They dye in evrie streete and at evrie gate, morning and eveninge, by viii or xii in a place, so that the like hath not byne hearde of. And the poore doth not onely die so in the streete, but the riche also in their bedde by 10 or 12 in a daye.'[13] *Disettes* were far less localised than plagues in their effects, and we have reports of similar conditions across almost the whole of northern France.[14]

As always happened, the soaring price of grain not only occasioned hardship and even starvation for those who depended upon the market for their daily bread; it also provoked a slump in industrial production, since demand for everything but the most basic necessities of life collapsed as people spent all their disposable income on food. Furthermore, the high cost of bread was not the only force depressing the economy in the later 1580s. After rising only mildly in nominal terms and actually decreasing in real terms under Charles IX (1560–74), taxes rose sharply during the reign of Henry III, particularly excise taxes and customs duties.[15] Bitter complaints about the burden of these new taxes could be heard from the early years of the 1580s onwards, and the excise duties even provoked artisans in certain trades to emigrate. The records of the house of Bonvisi, Lyons's richest merchant bankers, show their traffic in letters of exchange entering a phase of decline as early as 1583 and their total receipts dropping off sharply from 1587 on. Amiens, the country's greatest weaving town, saw its cloth production turn similarly downwards from 1586. In France's leading seaport, Rouen, trade slumped after 1585. The leading poles of northern France's economy had thus entered a period of decline even before the onset of widespread fighting in 1589.[16] In the countryside, meanwhile, the difficulties of the era led to open revolt in the region of Normandy around Lisieux. This revolt of the Gautiers remains very imperfectly understood. Apparently sparked in 1586 by resentment over taxes and/or the depredations of soldiers in the area, it simmered on for two years until the peasant rebels were enlisted in the cause of the League

by the Count of Harcourt, only to be abandoned at the moment of a decisive engagement with the royalist troops of the Duke of Montpensier and left to be slaughtered.[17]

By the time the Gautiers were crushed at Falaise, far more than their cause was being caught up in the conflict between royalists and *ligueurs*. From late 1588 onward, this conflict began to impinge on the lives of people throughout France far more directly than had previously been the case. In ordering the Duke of Guise killed at Blois in December 1588, Henry III wished to rid himself of the League's challenge to his authority. What he accomplished was to provoke full-scale rebellion. City after city renounced its allegiance to the 'tyrant', expelled all troops and officials loyal to him, and swore the Oath of the Union; in the words of one pro-League historian of the period, the king at Blois soon found the limits of his kingdom to be Tours and Beaugency.[18] But the strength of the League was not as great as it initially appeared. While most towns cast their lot against the king, certain major cities remained loyal: Rennes, Angers, Tours, Caen, Dieppe, Châlons-sur-Marne, and Saint-Quentin, to name only the most important royalist towns in northern France. Furthermore, there was enough of an air of urban radicalism about the League to awaken that great fear of the aristocracy – republicanism. This and the ties of interest and loyalty which bound many noblemen to the Crown led a substantial fraction of the nobility to oppose the League. Even in regions like Burgundy, the stronghold of the Duke of Mayenne and a province in which virtually all the major towns declared for the League, the nobility was about equally divided between royalists and *ligueurs*. Since many of the pro-League noblemen left the province to serve with Mayenne, the royalists actually controlled most of the countryside.[19] Every other province similarly divided into two rival camps.

The events of 1588–9 did not start a civil war; fighting had been under way since 1585. But the initial hostilities provoked by Henry III's reluctant crusade against the Huguenots had involved merely the sort of localised conflicts which had been the rule during the preceding civil wars. The region between Fontenay-le-Comte and Angers witnessed some campaigning late in 1585 and early in 1586. The German *reiters* intervened in 1587 with an ill fated expedition that saw them march – or, rather, loot – their way across a narrow band of Lorraine, Burgundy, and the Beauce, only to be routed by Guise at Auneau and sent quickly back again. Otherwise the campaigning was reassuringly confined to the Midi once more. That is what now changed. With the division of every province into two rival camps, a confused *petite guerre* of skirmishes, raids, and pillaging operations between each side's strongholds soon broke out. As one despairing merchant described the situation in 1589, 'No one can leave his house or send a letter from one place to another . . . for the cities are

fighting each other . . . and even within certain cities one man is fighting the next . . . No more courtesy or respect remains between father and son.'[20] With time, a few regions came to be entirely controlled by the troops of one side or the other. More commonly, the 'guerre des châteaux' simply became permanent, a means of survival for otherwise unpaid garrison soldiers. In a few areas, it degenerated into full-scale brigandage, most notoriously in the Basse-Bretagne of the dread Sieur de La Fontenelle.[21]

Meanwhile, alongside this *petite guerre* was the *grande guerre* between the Duke of Mayenne and his Spanish allies on one side and Henry III, Henry of Navarre, and their English reinforcements on the other. This large-scale fighting once more touched only relatively restricted areas, but now these were in the north. From 1589 to 1592, the cyclone moved up and down through a narrow corridor running from Tours and Orleans through the Beauce and around Paris, then down the lower Seine to Rouen and Dieppe. After 1592, Henry was in a sufficiently strong position to be able to dismiss many of his troops and rely less on arms than the internal paralysis of the League to bring people back into his camp, but 1594 saw La Capelle and Laon besieged and taken. The declaration of war against Spain in January 1595 led to campaigning in Burgundy and Brittany and a fitful war of sieges and surprises along the frontier of the Spanish Netherlands, a conflict that was only ended in 1598 by the utter financial exhaustion of both parties.

Such extensive fighting inevitably had considerable economic and demographic consequences. Unprotected by any walls, subject to the raiding parties of both sides, the countryside bore the most direct burdens. The local skirmishing alone posed so significant a threat to work in the fields that after 1589 troops had to be sent out into the countryside around many major cities to protect the peasants trying to get the harvest in. Around Dijon, for instance, the *vendange* became a complex military operation, with members of the city's harquebusiers accompanying cart-loads of *vignerons* from village to village and mounting guard as they gathered the grapes. Despite their protection, stray groups of *vignerons* were regularly picked off by royal raiding parties and held for ransom or forced labour; much of the 1591 vintage was captured by the troops; and the number of men available to work the fields gradually diminished as more and more villagers abandoned their homes for the safety of nearby cities or the adventure (and sustenance) offered by the bands of *mauvais garçons*.[22] The cumulative effect of the 'guerre des châteaux' on agricultural production is suggested by Albert Silbert's figures concerning grain production around Beaune, which shows tithe receipts in the years 1588–93 to have been 22 per cent lower than in 1581–6.[23] At the same time, the burden of taxes required to support the fighting rose in Burgundy

from 313,305 *écus* in 1584–6 to 977,946 *écus* in 1590–2 – and in many areas the troops of both sides demanded payment.[24] The weight of the soldiers' 'vols, exactions, et pilleries' complained about in so many documents of the period must also be added to the balance sheet of the effects of the *petite guerre*.

Wherever major campaigns occurred and large armies passed for any length of time, the burden was heavier yet. The troops typically stripped the land of all provisions and seized whatever livestock they could find. They usually left behind only two things: famine and disease. The Paris *mercuriale* in 1590–1, the curve of mortality in Rouen in 1592, and the evolution of baptisms in Toucy and Darnétal, two *gros bourgs* sacked and occupied during the wars, all provide statistical evidence of the dramatic consequences of major campaigning in an area.[25] The most vivid pictures of war's effects come from contemporary accounts such as Antoine Richart's description of the aftermath of the siege of Laon in 1594. Following the siege, the surrounding area had been so denuded of grain that wheat cost ten times as much locally as it did in nearby Châlons-sur-Marne and Saint-Quentin, and the inhabitants of the region were reduced to carting their bedding and clothing to these towns to trade them for bread. Although the construction work which began immediately on Laon's fortifications provided employment for the urban poor and reduced their suffering, many peasants of the surrounding countryside were obliged to sell their land to obtain food. The poorer ones were driven to foraging, an all but hopeless quest since many of the villages of the region were now half deserted and much of the land lay uncultivated. Some died in the fields, the victims either of starvation or the epidemic raging in the region. This in turn engendered another scourge: the wolves. In the absence of livestock they began to attack men, their appetite for human flesh having been whetted by the unburied corpses scattered across the countryside.[26]

Sheltered behind their ramparts, the cities could offer a degree of asylum from the violence unleashed on the *plat pays*. The vacant lots and stables of many towns consequently filled up with men and cows from the surrounding countryside. While the rural population was declining, often drastically, in the early 1590s, most cities for which demographic statistics have been assembled show a striking increase in their population.[27] But asylum was all that most cities could offer the refugees from the countryside – certainly not employment, or even relief, for the urban economy suffered almost as badly as the rural one. With travel rendered insecure, trade fell nearly everywhere to a mere fraction of its normal volume, although one or two advantageously located and well fortified cities such as La Rochelle managed to skim off some of the trade diverted from other cities and enjoy a measure of prosperity.[28] Industrial production for

anything other than purely local markets also collapsed, as the evidence for cloth production makes clear. (See Figure 5.4.) Even Paris' printers, to whom the League had initially been such a boon with its tracts and pamphlets, saw production in their industry fall to a small fraction of pre-1588 levels once the initial outpouring of propaganda subsided.[29] Although unemployment undoubtedly increased enormously, one is struck in reading through the activities of municipal governments in this period how little attention is given to providing relief for those out of work, even if special tax reductions were given to many guilds, 'vu la nécessité at calamité du temps', and house rents were ordered reduced in Paris. Migration was one response to this situation. Apprentices in Rouen broke their contracts to look for work in Flanders, while established merchants and artisans also left the city to seek better places to carry on their trade. The sharp rise in forest offences around Rouen and the arrest for theft of several Parisian printers suggest the more desperate measures to which others turned to meet the crisis.[30]

The desperation that could lead to crime could also lead to political action. In several cities, the *menu peuple* made its only appearance in the events of the League late in the movement's history with demonstrations or revolts against it. In the Burgundian cities, small incidents began early in 1594. Insults were uttered against *ligueur* mayors and militia captains, and stones were thrown through the windows of the ardently pro-League Jesuit house in Dijon. In February 1595 Beaune rose up and opened its gates to the King. Several months later Dijon and Autun followed.[31] The countryside meanwhile witnessed sporadic, small insurrections throughout the period 1589–94. Brittany was particularly unsettled. Scattered peasant risings continued as long as did the fighting, often taking on anti-seigneurial or anti-urban overtones.[32] Incidents also spread to Burgundy in the later years of this period. Châteaux were attacked around Beaune in 1592, soldiers were set upon and massacred by the *vignerons* of Meursault in 1594, and peasant bands took up arms for the King in several regions.[33] Though none of these movements could match the revolts of the Croquants and Tard-Avisés of the south-west in scale or organisation, northern France witnessed the same sort of militant, often anti-seigneurial, peace movement that marked the last years of the civil wars in the Midi.

Between January and August 1594, the groundswell of popular support for Henry IV combined with the richly rewarded defections of many wavering *ligueur* potentates to bring much of northern France back into the royal camp. Commerce resumed, *laboureurs* returned to their villages, and the work of reconstruction could begin. But the cycle of calamities was still incomplete, for both famine and plague each had one more visit to pay. The harvest had already failed in Lorraine in 1592, a failure unrelated

to France's civil wars and which probably represents the extension northward of the grave Mediterranean *disette* of that year.[34] The cold, wet weather which made the years from 1594 to 1596 so dismal in England caused bad harvests over virtually all of northern France as well. Grain prices soared from Lyons and Toul to Beauvais, Saint-Brieuc and Poitiers.[35] The plague also flared up in many localities between 1596 and 1598. Neither the plague nor the *disette* seem to have been quite as serious as those, respectively, of 1580–6 and 1586–7. In Rouen, for instance, mortality was only slightly above normal between 1596 and 1599, while the movement of baptisms suggests a strong recuperation in the town's overall population. On the other hand, Anjou, the Beauvaisis, and the Île de France were all peaceful regions which seem to have experienced a significant mortality crisis in these years.[36] Meanwhile, those regions in which the fighting had not yet been extinguished, most notably Burgundy and Brittany, suffered a nightmarish combination of plague, famine, and warfare. In the words of one Burgundian chronicler: 'Sur les dernières années le pauvre monde estoit cy ruinée que les maisons estoient toute démeublé, tellement qu'il n'y avoit rien demeurée que les quatre muralle . . . Toute l'armée estoit ycy alentour, qui mangere tout les bled, lequel ont ne moyssonnoy rien.'[37] For three consecutive years the harvests yielded less than half their normal output; by 1597 some 864 houses in the *bailliage* of Auxerre were destroyed and another 1,144 had been abandoned.[38] The situation in Cornouaille depicted by the canon Moreau was more dramatic yet. In certain areas, for want of livestock the peasants had to hitch themselves to the plough in teams of three or four, ploughing at night to escape the attention of the soldier-brigands. Here again great packs of wolves were on the prowl.[39] Relief came only with the surrender of Mercoeur and La Fontenelle in 1598, the good harvests of 1597 and 1598, and the abatement of the plague. Not until after 1598 can it be said that the crisis of the League was fully over.

II

Assessing the longer-term consequences of this combination of natural and political disasters is no easy matter, particularly since the crisis varied so much in character and chronology from region to region. We still know dismayingly little about French social and economic history from the later sixteenth into the early seventeenth centuries, and much of what we do know is based on studies of a few regions – the Hurepoix, the Toulois, Brittany – whose typicality of the rest of northern France is uncertain. Some tentative evaluations can none the less be attempted.

To begin with, quite obviously, the population was smaller in 1600 than

it had been two decades earlier. Just how much smaller is still uncertain, but the decline between the early 1580s and the late 1590s could have been as high as 20 per cent or more. That, at least, is the figure suggested by the evidence from the Pays Nantais. The rare information from other regions offers no reason to modify significantly such an estimate.[40]

More striking than this decline is the subsequent failure of the rural population to reattain its sixteenth-century peaks in many areas despite the demographic growth which occurred during the first third of the seventeenth century. This phenomenon has been observed in four different corners of the great open-field region surrounding Paris, although it emphatically did not occur in Brittany, whose rural economy rested on an unusually diversified base that included fishing and a growing linen industry as well as the production of cereal crops.[41] The restricted population growth can in turn be related to two other phenomena: the somewhat higher age at first marriage found in many areas in the seventeenth century by comparison with the sixteenth, and the slightly lower levels of agricultural output revealed by tithe records. All these symptoms point to a reduction in the productive capacity of rural society and in the opportunities for young men to establish households of their own.

Three effects of the late-sixteenth-century crisis could have contributed to this. First, the crisis reduced the supplemental resources available to all members of the village community. Both the unusually high tax demands of the period and the additional protection money often extorted by soldiers pushed many rural communities so deeply into debt that they had to alienate communal land.[42] With less common land, there was less opportunity for those makeshifts such as pasturing a few head of cattle or letting a pig or two loose in the forest on which so many members of the village community depended for bridging the gap between the output of their land and the needs of their families.

Second, the resources of individual villagers were also thoroughly depleted, so thoroughly that they could only be reconstructed at the expense of new forms of dependence. Livestock, always the favourite target of the foraging soldier, was in particularly short supply by 1598. In the short run, this meant less manure and hence lower agricultural productivity. In the long run herds could be replenished, but the only way in which many villagers could now afford a cow was to rent one. The frequently encountered practice of renting livestock is one of the most striking symptoms of the poverty of the old-regime peasantry, and it is precisely around the end of the sixteenth century that this practice seems to have begun to spread widely.[43] An even more notorious form of peasant dependence encountered in many parts of the countryside by the end of the old regime, *métayage*, or crop-sharing, also experienced its first significant

expansion in certain regions, as a way of rebuilding from the crisis of the late sixteenth century.[44] This development was linked to the third and most significant change in rural society: the expropriation of many smallholders by outsiders to the village community and the consequent polarisation of rural society between an elite of *laboureurs* and *fermiers* and the mass of *journaliers, métayers, sossons,* and *haricotiers.*

This last development forms one of the great themes of French rural history from the reign of Francis I until that of Louis XIV. In every area where the evolution of property ownership has been followed over part or all of this period, small peasant holders lost ground while their richer neighbours and bourgeois or noble outsiders came to control more and more of the land. Such an ongoing process obviously cannot be linked to a single short period. It stemmed ultimately from demographic pressure which forced the subdivision of land-holdings into parcels smaller than the minimum needed to provide a family with the food it required, aggravated in the seventeenth century by the growing burden of taxation. None the less, the transfer of property was particularly likely to occur in periods of war or *cherté*, when high prices and extraordinary exactions forced many poorer peasants so deeply into debt that they could only extricate themselves by surrendering part of their land. By virtue of their exceptional severity, both the warfare and the *disette* of the end of the sixteenth century provoked a particularly rapid turnover in land.

Guy Cabourdin has used notarial records brilliantly to illuminate this process in the Toulois. Price fluctuations and the volume of certain kinds of notarial transactions, he shows, moved with a striking parallelism; as grain prices increased following a bad harvest, so too did the number of contracts in which villagers either sold land or borrowed the grain they needed to tide themselves over to the next harvest. The loans of grain, usually for six or seven months, peaked in April; a second peak of land sales then followed in December or January, as those peasants unable to pay off their loans now had to surrender some of their land. Not surprisingly, the volume of land transactions was particularly high throughout the period from 1586 to the end of the century. And Cabourdin shows who profited most from the smallholder's plight: prosperous peasants to some extent (they purchased 17·5 per cent of the land sold), but primarily nobles and *anoblis* (35 per cent of the land acquired), urban merchants, lawyers, and even artisans (29 per cent), and the First Estate (13·5 per cent).[45]

It is clear that other regions witnessed the same surge of peasant expropriation in the late 1580s and 1590s,[46] but it may be wondered whether the identity of those who profited was the same elsewhere as it was in Lorraine. While sharing France's climate and epidemics, Lorraine was an independent duchy and thus escaped the worst of the civil wars.

Unfortunately we have no other studies of land turnover in the period as detailed as Cabourdin's, but those areas harder hit by fighting and brigandage than Lorraine probably witnessed a slightly different pattern to such transactions. Richer peasants would have been less able to profit from their poorer neighbours' distress wherever warfare was significant, for they suffered the worst losses of all whenever soldiers passed their way. Certainly it was with good reason that they were always the first to flee at rumours of approaching troops. They owned the most livestock. They owned the silver goblets and well stocked chests looted so thoroughly by the *soldataille* in Moreau's Cornouaille.[47] Conversely, if anybody was in a position to profit from the disorder, it was those in the marauding armies, and particularly those at their head. Not that there was not a debit side to warfare for the nobility. Like all those dependent on land rents, the income of their *terres* fell sharply as the rural economy was disrupted.[48] Furthermore, war was a risky business, not only because one might not return from it at all, but also because one could return in the situation of Jérome de Luc, sieur de Fontenay-le-Comte, who had to excuse himself from the *ban* and *arrière-ban* in 1597 on the grounds that the ransom of 200 *écus* he had had to borrow several years previously had left him hopelessly in debt to a merchant of Orleans. His case was not unique.[49] But no other group had the nobility's opportunities for offsetting the losses of war. The *hobereau* with even the slightest military bent might fortify his château, revive or invent tolls, dues and exactions, and terrorise the peasantry – as many did. According to Moreau, 'Les casaniers, qui ne cherchaient que le petite guerre . . . faisaient bien leurs affaires.'[50] As for the great military commanders, while they often had to advance large sums to their troops during the fighting, the most important among them received a handsome return on these investments in the form of the huge pensions paid out by Henry IV to bring the *ligueur* commanders into the fold or to reward his faithful servants. A man like the Duke of Villars, granted an annual pension of 60,000 *livres* and the income of five fat abbeys, ended the Wars of Religion with his fortune made.[51] The complaint of the commoner in the famous *Dialogue d'entre le Maheustre et le Manant* deserves to be taken seriously: 'the nobles and soldiers enjoy war and we pay for all'.[52]

The consequences of the crisis for urban society are more problematic. Were there any significant shifts in urban social structure or wealth distribution? Did the poorer artisans have to sell their tools just as poorer peasants sold their land, thereby accelerating the polarisation evident within many trades between wealthy master-entrepreneurs and permanent journeymen? These questions simply have never been investigated. It does seem that the state of urban finances often deteriorated in the same way as those of the rural communities, a development with ominous future implications for municipal autonomy since the sorry state of a

town's fiscal situation was often used later in the seventeenth century to justify increasing royal intervention.[53] A town's indebtedness could also have unfortunate immediate consequences for its town councillors, who frequently had to cover the debts out of their own pockets. In 1596 Orleans' entire *Corps de Ville* petitioned to be relieved of its duties for this reason.[54] Perhaps the clearest consequence of the crisis for France's urban communities is the permanent economic damage it inflicted on the country's leading commercial cities. Lyons's position as a leading European financial capital, already shaken by the events of the 1560s, ended for good between 1588 and 1595 when the great majority of the city's foreign merchant-bankers abandoned the town.[55] In a similar fashion, the unusual prosperity brought Rouen by Antwerp's decline was forfeited when warfare brought disruption to Normandy as well.[56]

In so far as the long-term effects of the economic disruption and recurring subsistence crises of the last decades of the sixteenth century can be ascertained, they thus seem to have depressed the productive capacity of the French economy and increased the polarisation of wealth, at least within rural society. This is not to imply, however, that they must have had a significant destabilising effect on French society, for that would be to overlook a final and particularly important consequence of the crisis. Later historians might pick apart the precise elements of political, meteorological, and epidemiological disaster which went into the *malheurs* of this harsh *fin de siècle*. Contemporaries almost uniformly perceived them as the interrelated fruits of the civil war. The lesson seemed to be how terribly dangerous theories of popular sovereignty and rebellion against the duly constituted sovereign could be. In the process whereby sixteenth-century ideas of the right of resistance to tyrants and of the place of the Estates General in the ancient constitution became discredited and gave way to the triumph of absolutist theories – a change of opinion symbolised by the third estate's famous request at the Estates General of 1614 that it be declared a fundamental law of France that the king holds his crown from God alone – the frightful economic crisis associated with the events of 1585–98 played a major role.

Appendix 5.1 Some Evidence on Population

Although parish registers from the sixteenth century are relatively scarce, figures are available on the number of baptisms in a few scattered areas. These offer the best measure of the evolution of the population over the late sixteenth century. This table lists the average number of annual

baptisms in those communities for which figures have been published. The reader's attention is also called to the important graph in Jean-Marc Moriceau, 'Mariages et foyers paysans aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles: l'exemple des campagnes du sud de Paris', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, vol. 28 (1981), p. 483.

1 RURAL AREAS AND BOURGS

18 rural parishes of the Pays Nantais		*Toucy (Burgundy)*	
1550–4	760	1549–84	140
1555–9	724	1585–99	92
1560–4	668	*Souvigny (Touraine)*	
1565–9	719	1580–9	37
1570–4	731	1590–9	30
1575–9	793	*Darnétal (Normandy) (one parish)*	
1580–4	708	1585–9	117
1585–9	676	1590–4	38
1590–4	616	1595–9	72
1595–9	563	*Saint-Lambert-des-Levées (Anjou)*	
		1564–89	127
		1590–9	120

2 FOUR CITIES

	Rouen (20 parishes and Protestant temple)	*Nantes (8 parishes)*	*Saint-Malo*	*Compiègne*
1550–4		616		
1555–9		594		
1560–4		608		
1565–9		652		
1570–4	2109	747	313	
1575–9	2229	866	345	337
1580–4	2302	701	303	349
1585–9	1900	733	335	333
1590–4	1676	836	384	446
1595–9	1995	901	435	339

3 FOUR SMALLER TOWNS

	Le Croisic	*Chateaubriant*	*Meulan (one parish)*	*Coulommiers*
1550–4	160	71		
1555–9	155	64		
1560–4	173	73		238
1565–9	167	67		244
1570–4	155	48		239
1575–9	167	69	21·4	229
1580–4	150	55	23·6	220
1585–9	174	52	22·6	213
1590–4	180	60	27	–
1595–9	184	82	15	162

Sources: Nantes, Saint-Malo, Le Croisic, Chateaubriant and the Pays Nantais – A. Croix, *Nantes et le Pays Nantais* . . . (Paris, 1974), p. 87 and tables 1–5, 7–8, 10–11, 13–14, 16–19, 21–2, 28, 31–40; Rouen – Benedict, 'Rouen during the Wars of Religion: popular disorder, public order, and the confessional struggle' (unpublished PhD. thesis, Princeton University, 1975), Appendix IV; Meulan – Marcel Lachiver, *La Population de Meulan du XVIIe au XIXe siècle (vers 1600–vers 1870): Étude de démographie historique* (Paris, 1969), p. 215; Darnétal – Archives Départmentales de la Seine-Maritime, E, St-Ouen-de-Longpaon; Toucy, Souvigny, and Saint-Lambert-des-Levées – Pierre Goubert, 'Recent theories and research in French population between 1500 and 1700', in D. V. Glass and D. E. C. Eversley (eds), *Population in History* (London, 1965), pp. 464–5; Coulommiers – J.-C. Polton, 'Coulommiers et Chailly-en-Brie (1557–1715),' *Annales de Démographie Historique* (1969), p. 29; and Compiègne – Carolus Barré, 'La Paroisse Saint-Jacques de Compiège sous Henri III et Henri IV d'après les Registres de Catholicité' and 'La Paroisse Saint-Antoine de Compiègne de 1554 à 1610 d'après les Registres de Catholicité, '*Société Historique de Compiègne: procès-verbaux, rapports et communications diverses*, vol. 34 (1931), pp. 77–8, and vol. 37 (1934–6), pp. 156–8. For Rouen, Nantes, and the 18 rural parishes of the Pays Nantais, gaps in the registers of individual parishes have been corrected for by assuming an evolution parallel to that of the other parishes for which records are available.

Notes: Chapter 5

1 The sharp regional contrasts in economic evolution emerge from: J. Jacquart, *La Crise rurale en Île-de-France, 1550–1670* (Paris, 1974), ch. 5; P. Goubert, 'Recent theories and research in French population between 1500 and 1700', in D. V. Glass and D. E. C. Eversley (eds), *Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography* (London, 1965), pp. 463–6; Goubert, 'Registres paroissiaux et démographie dans la France du XVIe siècle', *Annales de Démographie historique* (1965), pp. 43–8 (both reprinted with a few additional observations in Goubert, *Clio parmi les hommes* (Paris, 1976), pp. 171–94); F. Lebrun, 'Registres paroissiaux et démographie en Anjou au XVIe siècle', *Annales de démographie historique* (1965), pp. 49–50; A. Croix, *Nantes et le Pays Nantais au XVIe siècle: étude démographique* (Paris, 1974), ch. 5; J. Tanguy, *Le Commerce du port de Nantes au milieu de XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1956), pp. 78–9; P. Benedict, 'Catholics and Huguenots in sixteenth-century Rouen: the demographic effects of the religious wars', *French Historical Studies*, vol. 9 (1975), pp. 209–34; Benedict, 'Rouen's foreign trade in the age of the religious wars (1560–1600)', *Journal of European Economic History* (vol. 13 (1984),

pp. 29–74); J. Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: The Magistrates of the Parlement of Rouen, 1499–1610* (Princeton, NJ, 1980), pp. 201–20; B. Garnier, 'Pays herbagers, pays céréaliers et pays "ouverts" en Normandie (XVIe–début du XIXe siècle)', *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, vol. 53 (1975), p. 503; J. Goy and E. Le Roy Ladurie (eds), *Les Fluctuations du produit de la dîme: conjoncture décimale et domaniale de la fin du Moyen Age au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1972), pp. 21, 44–57, 134–52; P. Deyon, 'Variations de la production textile aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles: sources et premiers résultats', *Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* (hereafter *Annales ESC*), vol. 18 (1963), pp. 948–9; J.-L. Bourgeon, *Les Colbert avant Colbert: destin d'une famille marchande* (Paris, 1973), p. 166; R. Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle: Lyon et ses marchands (vers 1520–vers 1580)* (Paris, 1971), pt II; and F. Bayard, 'Les Bonvisi, marchands-banquiers à Lyon, 1575–1629', *Annales ESC*, Vol. 26 (1971), pp. 1234–69. These works represent the basic bibliography on the northern French economy in the later sixteenth century and will serve as the basis for much of what follows.

2 Jacquart, *Crise rurale*, ch. 5, pt 3.

3 H. Drouot, 'Vin, vignes, et vignerons de la Côte dijonnaise pendant la Ligue', *Revue de Bourgogne*, vol. 1 (1911), p. 361.

4 Goubert, 'Recent theories', pp. 464–5; Croix, *Nantes*, pp. 139–50.

5 The *mercuriales* in Figure 5.2 also demonstrate significant regional variations in the pattern of high prices between 1590 and 1595, a function of the varying intensity and chronology of the fighting of these years and of localised meteorological disasters.

6 *Mémoires de Jacques Carorguy, greffier de Bar-sur-Seine* (Paris, 1880), p. 2.

7 The fullest list of those areas touched by the plague is in J.-N. Biraben, *Les Hommes et la Peste en France et dans les pays européens et méditerranéens* (Paris, 1975), Vol. 1, pp. 377–88, which indicates forty-five towns in the northern half of the kingdom infected between 1580 and 1586.

8 See Appendix to this chapter. The plague was also serious in Anjou and much of Burgundy. See here F. Lebrun, *Les Hommes et la Mort en Anjou aux 17e et 18e siècles: essai de démographie et de psychologie historiques* (Paris, 1971), pp. 303–8; H. Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne: Étude sur la Ligue (1587–1596)* (Paris, 1937), Vol. 1, p. 26.

9 See Appendix to this chapter. The evolution of Compiègne and Coulommiers appears to have been similar.

10 Carorguy, *Mémoires*, p. 9.

11 P. Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 173.

12 E. Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville, 1576–1594* (Paris, 1868–73), Vol. 1, pp. 277–86.

13 Benedict, *Rouen*, pp. 10, 173.

14 For evidence of the *disette* and its effects across Burgundy, Franche-Comté and the Lyonnais, see Drouot, *Mayenne*, p. 29; in Lorraine, G. Cabourdin, *Terre et Hommes en Lorraine (1550–1635): Toulois et Comté de Vaudémont* (Nancy, 1977), pp. 159–60; in Bar-sur-Seine, Carorguy, *Mémoires*, p. 8; around Laon, A. Richart, *Mémoires sur la Ligue dans le Laonnois* (Laon, 1869), p. 505; in Rheims, J. Pussot, 'Mémoires ou journalier', *Travaux de l'Académie Impériale de Reims*, vol. 23 (1856), pp. 172–4; in Abbeville, Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville*, Vol. 1, pp. 277–86; in Brittany, Figure 5.1 and Croix, *La Bretagne*, pp. 270–1, which indicates an attenuated crisis in Haute-Bretagne. Basse-Bretagne may have escaped the *disette* entirely. The *mercuriale* of Saint-Brieuc is absolutely level in these years. J. Meyer, *La Noblesse bretonne au 18e siècle* (Paris, 1966), p. 848.

15 Benedict, *Rouen*, pp. 156–9.

16 Ibid., p. 161, and 'Rouen's foreign trade' pp. 60–2; Deyon, 'Variations de la production textile', pp. 948–9; Bayard, 'Les Bonvisi', pp. 1255–8.

17 J. Davies, 'Popular revolts in Normandy', *History Today*, vol. 31 (December 1981), pp. 24–9, is now the best introduction to what is known about the Gautiers.

18 BN, MS Français 23295, 'Histoire de la Ligue', fo. 466. This is perhaps the fullest guide to the politics of this period. J.-H. Mariéjol, *La Réforme et la Ligue*, Vol. 6, pt 1 of E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1900–11), is a more easily accessible standard work.

19 Drouot, *Mayenne*, pt 1, ch. 4.

20 H. Lapeyre, *Une Famille de marchands, les Ruiz: Contribution à l'étude du commerce entre la France et l'Espagne au temps de Philippe II* (Paris, 1955), p. 431.

21 The constant local skirmishing emerges from virtually any local history of the League. On the particularly serious brigandage in Brittany, see J. Moreau, *Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Bretagne durant les Guerres de la Ligue* (Brest, 1836), *passim*; and A. La Borderie and B. Pocquet, *Histoire de Bretagne* (Rennes, 1913), ch. 19.

22 Drouot, 'Vin, vignes, et vignerons', pp. 347–55. Troops were similarly raised to protect the villagers getting in the harvest around Paris and Amiens, while other towns sought to work out treaties with their enemies 'pour le repos des laboureurs'. A. Dubois, *La Ligue: Documents rélatifs à la Picardie d'après les registres de l'échevinage d'Amiens* (Amiens, 1859), p. 65; Prarond, *Ligue à Abbeville*, Vol. 2, pp. 217–18 and *passim*. Neither method seems ever to have been very successful.

23 Silbert, 'La production des céréales à Beaune d'après les dîmes, XVI^{e}–XVIII^{e} siècles', in Goy and Le Roy Ladurie (eds), *Fluctuations de la dîme*, p. 151. Bernard Garnier's figures suggest a similar, although perhaps slightly less sharp, decline in agricultural output in three regions of Basse-Normandie. Garnier, 'Pays herbagers', p. 503. The precise decline during the war years unfortunately cannot be calculated since the author provides figures only on a decade-by-decade basis.

24 Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 2, p. 104.

25 See Figure 5.1 and 5.2 and Appendix. Croix, *La Bretagne*, pp. 270–7, is also valuable here.

26 Richart, *Mémoires sur la Ligue dans le Laonnois*, pp. 485–7. Confirmation of the frightful mortality in this region may be found in Noël Valois (ed.), *Inventaire des arrêts du Conseil d'État (règne de Henri IV)* (Paris, 1886–93), entries 1790, 1873, 1914, 1924 and 2839. The numerous *arrêts* such as these granting tax relief for communities badly hit by the fighting provide at least a rough indication of the geography of the civil war's worst ravages. As one might expect, this corresponds fairly closely to the geography of campaigning indicated above. The greatest number of such *arrêts* concern villages located in a corridor stretching from the modern department of the Yonne through Paris and into the Eure (Yonne, ten communities; Seine-et-Oise, thirteen communities, Seine-et-Marne, seventeen communities and a general decree for the *élection* of Meaux; old department of the Seine, nineteen communities; Oise, eighteen communities; Eure, twelve communities). Many reductions were also granted to communities in the region of the Loire valley centring on Blois (Loir-et-Cher, eleven communities, Indre-et-Loire, nine communities and general decree for the *généralité* of Tours; Maine-et-Loire, five communities; Loiret, four communities). Finally, the fighting around Laon is reflected in *arrêts* concerning eighteen communities in the Aisne. The other regions of northern France are represented by a few *arrêts*, with the exception of Basse-Normandie and Maine, for which there are almost none. These areas were secured by Henry IV early on in the fighting and probably suffered less from this civil war than any other part of northern France. One also finds no *arrêts* concerning Brittany between 1594 and 1597, but this is because the province was outside Henry IV's control until 1598.

27 Such an increase can be observed in Nantes, Le Croisic, Chateaubriant, Saint-Malo, Meulan, Saint-Denis, Compiègne and Metz, although not Rouen. See, in addition to the Appendix, E. Lesgold and M. Richard, 'St Denis aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles (1560–1670)', *Bulletin de la Société de Démographie Historique*, vol. 2 (1971), pp. 15–19; Cabourdin, *Terre et Hommes*, p. 157.

28 La Rochelle enjoyed 'un trafic comme incroyable' between 1592 and 1594, largely as a result of trade that normally went to Nantes or Bordeaux. Lyons and Rouen, on the other hand, were both abandoned by most of the members of their large colonies of foreign merchants, and in the latter trade in wine and linen can be measured to have been just 20–33 per cent its pre-1588 volume during the early 1590s. Nantes, too, saw its wine trade suffer, and the commerce of many smaller inland cities seems to have been brought to an almost complete standstill. Saint-Malo may be a second town whose trade was not too seriously interrupted in these years. E. Trocmé and M. Delafosse, *Le Commerce rochelais de la fin de XVe au début du XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1952), p. 198; Bayard, 'Les Bonvisi', pp. 1256–9; Gascon, *Grand commerce*, pp. 597–9, 607–10; Benedict, 'Rouen's foreign trade' pp. 64–5; Lapeyre, *Les Ruiz*, pp. 429–35; J. Delumeau, 'Le commerce extérieur français au XVIIe siècle', *XVIIe siècle*, 70–1 (1966), p. 82; Carorguy, *Mémoires*,

passim, esp. pp. 150–1; B. d'Houet, *Compiègne pendant les guerres de religion et la Ligue* (Compiègne, 1910), p. 94; C. Laronze, *Essai sur le régime municipal en Bretagne pendant les guerres de religion* (Paris, 1890), p. 231.

29 D. Pallier, *Recherches sur l'imprimerie à Paris pendant la Ligue (1585–1594)* (Geneva, 1975), p. 16.

30 Ibid., pp. 119–30; Benedict, *Rouen*, pp. 222–4, 226; Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 2, p. 126 n.

31 Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 2, pp. 286–8. Urban uprisings against the League also occurred in Amiens and Rheims. Dubois, *La Ligue*, pp. 89–90, 100; Pussot, 'Mémoires', *Travaux de l'Académie Impériale de Reims*, vol. 25 (1857), p. 22.

32 Moreau, *Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Bretagne*, ch. 7; J. H. M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1975), pp. 278–9.

33 Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 2, pp. 395–6, 409–15, and 'Vin, vignes, et vignerons', pp. 359–60.

34 Cabourdin, *Terre et Hommes*, pp. 104–50, 347.

35 For prices in Poitiers, see Paul Raveau, 'La crise des prix au XVIe siècle en Poitou', *Revue historique*, vol. 162 (1929), p. 282.

36 Goubert, 'Registres paroissiaux et démographie dans la France', p. 45; Lebrun, 'Registres paroissiaux et démographie en Anjou', p. 50; Jacquart, *Crise rurale*, pp. 185–6.

37 M. C. Oursel (ed.), 'Deux livres de raison bourguignons', *Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de Géographie et d'Histoire*, vol. 24 (1908), p. 360.

38 Silbert, 'Production de céréales à Beaune', p. 151; Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 2, p. 137.

39 Moreau, *Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Bretagne*, pp. 335–7. See also H. Sée, *Les Classes rurales en Bretagne du XVIe siècle à la Révolution* (Paris, 1906), pp. 473–4. Most of the information on these years in Croix, *La Bretagne*, pp. 277–82, concerns Haute-Bretagne, which also experienced a major, albeit less dramatic, mortality crisis born of the combination of war, plague and famine.

40 In the Hurepoix the decline appears to have been closer to 30 per cent. J.-M. Moriceau, 'Mariages et foyers paysans aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles: l'exemple des campagnes du sud de Paris', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, vol. 28 (1981), p. 483.

41 Compare the examples cited by Le Roy Ladurie, 'Les masses profondes: la paysannerie', in F. Braudel and E. Labrousse (eds), *Histoire économique et sociale de la France* (Paris, 1970–), Vol. 1, pt 2, pp. 728–9; and J.-M. Constant, 'La propriété et la problème de la constitution des fermes sur les censives en Beauce aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, *Revue historique*, vol. 249 (1973), p. 365; with Croix, *La Bretagne*, ch. 3.

42 Cabourdin, *Terre et Hommes*, pp. 304–14; Jacquart, *Crise rurale*, pp. 220–3; P. de Saint-Jacob, 'Mutations économiques et sociales dans les campagnes bourguignonnes à la fin du XVIe siècle', *Études rurales*, vol. 1 (1961), pp. 38–40.

43 Cabourdin, *Terre et Hommes*, pp. 609–10; Saint-Jacob, 'Mutations', p. 37.

44 L. Merle, *La Métairie et l'Évolution agraire de la Gâtine poitevine de la fin du Moyen Âge à la Révolution* (Paris, 1958), pp. 179–80; Saint-Jacob, 'Mutations', pp. 45–8.

45 Cabourdin, *Terre et Hommes*, pp. 377–424.

46 Jacquart, *Crise rurale*, pp. 214–20; Saint-Jacob, 'Mutations', pp. 40–3; E. Gruter, *La Naissance d'un grand vignoble: les seigneuries de Pizay et Tanay en Beaujolais au XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Lyon, 1977), ch. 9.

47 Moreau, *Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Bretagne*, p. 152.

48 For the decline in land rents, see J.-P. Desaive, 'A la recherche d'un indicateur de la conjoncture: Baux de Notre-Dame de Paris et de l'abbaye de Montmartre', in Goy and Le Roy Ladurie, *Fluctuations de la dîme*, pp. 50–5; Jacquart, 'La rente foncière, indice conjoncturel', *Revue historique*, vol. 253 (1975), pp. 364–5; Dewald, *Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, pp. 212–13; and Deyon, *Contribution à l'étude des revenus fonciers en Picardie: les fermages de l'Hôtel-Dieu d'Amiens et leurs variations de 1515 à 1789* (Lille, n.d.), p. 73.

49 Jacquart, *Crise rurale*, pp. 223–7; Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 2, pp. 311–13.

50 Moreau, *Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Bretagne*, p. 153. For varieties of the seigneurial reaction of these years, see Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 1, pp. 348–52, Vol. 2, pp. 135–7, 316–23; Trocmé and Delafosse, *Commerce Rochelais*, p. 145 (new tolls); C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire (ed.), *Cahiers des états de Normandie sous la regne de Henri IV* (Rouen,

1880–2), Vol. 1, pp. 79–80, 85 (complaints about fortified châteaux and unauthorised *corvées*).

51 According to J. Russell Major, Henry IV's pensions to *ligueur* noblemen totalled 24,000,000 *livres*: 'Noble income, inflation, and the wars of religion in France', *American Historical Review*, vol. 86 (1981), p. 42. This article assembles a good deal of evidence of warfare proving profitable for leading military commanders.

52 F. Cromé, *Dialogue d'entre le maheustre et le manant*, ed. P. Ascoli (Geneva, 1977), p. 75.

53 Drouot, *Mayenne*, Vol. 2, pp. 108–12; d'Houet, *Compiègne*, pp. 76–7. This latter case is slightly ambiguous. The municipal deficit increased sharply to a level twice annual revenues in the years 1595–8; it is unclear if this rise is related to the crisis of the League.

54 F. Bonnardot, 'Essai historique sur le régime municipal à Orléans d'après les documents conservés aux archives de la ville (1389–1780)', *Mémoires de la Société Archéologique et Historique de l'Orléanais*, vol. 18 (1884), pp. 124–5.

55 Gascon, *Grand commerce*, Vol. 2, ch. 3.

56 Benedict, 'Rouen's foreign trade', pp. 63 ff.